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Abstract
Android OS experiences a blazing popularity since the last few years. This predominant platform has established itself
not only in the mobile world but also in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. This popularity, however, comes at
the expense of security, as it has become a tempting target of malicious apps. Hence, there is an increasing need for
sophisticated, automatic, and portable malware detection solutions. In this paper, we propose MalDozer, an automatic
Android malware detection and family attribution framework that relies on sequences classification using deep learning
techniques. Starting from the raw sequence of the app’s API method calls, MalDozer automatically extracts and learns
the malicious and the benign patterns from the actual samples to detect Android malware. MalDozer can serve as a
ubiquitous malware detection system that is not only deployed on servers, but also on mobile and even IoT devices.
We evaluate MalDozer on multiple Android malware datasets ranging from 1K to 33K malware apps, and 38K benign
apps. The results show that MalDozer can correctly detect malware and attribute them to their actual families with an
F1-Score of 96%− 99% and a false positive rate of 0.06%− 2%, under all tested datasets and settings.
Keywords: Mobile, Android, Malware, IoT, Deep Learning
1. Introduction
Mobile apps have become an inherent part of our ev-
eryday life since many of the services are provided to us
through mobile apps. The latter change the way we com-
municate, as they are installed in most cases on smart
devices. In contrast to personal computers, smart devices
are equipped with sophisticated sensors, from cameras and
microphones to gyroscopes and GPS [1]. These various
sensors open a whole new world of applications for end-
users [1], and generate huge amounts of data, which con-
tain highly sensitive information. Consequently, this raises
the need for security solutions to protect users from ma-
licious apps, which exploit the sophistication of the smart
devices and their sensitive data. On the other hand, the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) smart systems have become equally,
if not more, important than the mobile ones: (i) IoT sys-
tems are not only installed on conventional devices such as
phones but are also considered in critical systems such as
industrial IoT devices [2][3]. (ii) According to Ericsson [4],
the number of IoT devices is expected to surpass the num-
ber of mobile devices by 2018 and could reach 16 billion
by 2021. In this setting, security solutions should defend
against malicious apps targeting both mobile and IoT de-
vices. Android OS is phenomenally growing by powering
a vast spectrum of smart devices. It has the biggest share
in the mobile computing industry with 85% in 2017-Q1
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[5] due to its open-source distribution and sophistication.
Besides, it has become not only the dominant platform
for mobile phones and tablets but is also gaining increas-
ing attention and penetration in the IoT realm [6],[7],[8].
In this context, Google has launched Android Things [9],
an Android OS for IoT devices, where developers benefit
from the mature Android stack to develop IoT apps target-
ing thin devices [10], [9], [11], [12]. Therefore, protecting
Android devices from malicious apps is of parmount im-
portance.
Problem Statement. To address the above challenges, there
is a clear need for a solution that defends against malicious
apps in mobile and IoT devices with specific requirements
to overcome the limitations of existing Android malware
detection systems. First, the Android malware detection
system should ensure a high accuracy with minimum false
alarms. Second, it should be able to operate at different
deployment scales: (i) Server machines, (ii) Personal ma-
chines, (iii) Smartphones and tablets, and (iv) IoT devices.
Third, detecting that a given app is malicious may not be
enough, as more information about the threat is needed to
prioritize the mitigation actions. The type of attack could
be crucial to prevent the intended damage. Therefore, it is
essential to have a solution that goes a step further and at-
tributes the malware to a specific family, which defines the
potential threat that our system is exposed to. Finally, it
is necessary to minimize manual human intervention to the
largest extent and make the detection dependent mainly
on the app sample for automatic feature extraction and
pattern recognition. As malicious apps are quickly getting
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stealthier, the security analyst should be able to catch up
with this pace. This is due to the fact that for every new
malware family, a manual analysis of the samples is re-
quired to identify its pattern and features that distinguish
it from benign apps.
Solution. In this paper, we propose MalDozer, a simple,
yet effective and efficient framework for Android malware
detection based on sequences mining using neural net-
works. MalDozer framework is based on an artificial neu-
ral network that takes, as input, the raw sequences of
API method calls, as they appears in the DEX file, to
enable malware detection and family attribution. During
the training, MalDozer can automatically recognize ma-
licious patterns using only the sequences of raw method
calls in the assembly code. MalDozer achieves a high accu-
racy in malware detection under multiple datasets, includ-
ing Malgenome [13] (1K samples), Drebin [14] (5.5K sam-
ples), our MalDozer dataset (20K samples), and a merged
dataset of 33K malware samples. Additionally, 38K be-
nign apps downloaded from Google Play [15] are also used
in the evaluation. MalDozer achieves an F1-score between
96% and 99% in the detection task. Furthermore, using
the same datasets, MalDozer can correctly attribute the
Android malware to the actual family with an F1-score
between 96% and 98% in the family attribution task. Mal-
Dozer is both effective and also efficient. We evaluate the
efficiency of MalDozer under multiple deployment archi-
tectures, ranging from high-end servers to very small IoT
devices [12]. The results of our evaluation confirm that
MalDozer can efficiently run on all these devices. The
key idea of MalDozer relies on using neural networks on
the API assembly method invocations to identify Android
malware. More precisely, the input of MalDozer is the se-
quences of the API method calls as they appear in the
DEX file, where a sequence represents the Android app.
First, we map each method in the sequence invocation to
a fixed length high-dimensional vector that semantically
represents the method invocation [16] and replace the se-
quence of the Android app methods by a sequence of vec-
tors. Afterward, we feed the sequence of vectors to a neural
network with multiple layers. In this paper, we make the
following contributions:
• MalDozer, a novel, effective, and efficient Android
malware detection framework using the raw sequences
of API method calls based on neural networks. We
take a step beyond malware detection by attributing
the detected Android malware to its family with a
high accuracy.
• We propose an automatic feature extraction tech-
nique during the training using method embedding,
where the input is the raw sequence of API method
calls, extracted from DEX assembly.
• We conduct an extensive evaluation on different data-
sets real Android malware and benign apps. The
results demonstrate that MalDozer is very efficient
and effective. It is also resilient against API evo-
lution over time and against changing the order of
API method calls. Additionally, MalDozer could be
deployed and run properly, at various scales.
2. Background
In this section, we provide the necessary background
that is relevant to our framework. We start by defining
the cornerstone of MalDozer, namely neural network, and
why it is interesting in the context of Android malware
detection (Section 2.1). Afterward, we present the threat
model as well as the assumptions considered in MalDozer
design (Section 2.2). Next, we enumerate the main use
cases of MalDozer framework (Section 2.3).
2.1. Deep Learning and Neural Network
A neural network is a machine learning computation
model, which relies on a large number of neural units. The
latter are approximate abstractions of the brain neurons,
which could solve a very complex problem using highly
dense neurons connected to each other by axons. Typ-
ically, Artificial Neuron Network (ANN) is composed of
multiple layers, where each layer has many artificial neu-
rons. The first layer is the input layer, and the last layer
is the output one. The rest of the layers are called hid-
den layers. Notice that the neurons in each layer i are
connected to layer i+ 1, but the connection method could
differ from a model to another. To this end, in the deep
learning terminology, a neural network consists of multiple
hidden layers, i.e., the more layers there are, the deeper
the neural network is. The conventional machine learning
methods are limited by the manually-crafted features from
the raw data. Here, the security expert analyzes the ma-
licious apps and extracts the relevant features. The latter
will be fed to a classifier to produce a learning model. The
main advantage of a neural network is that it could auto-
matically learn the representation (features) from the raw
data to perform the detection task. In this paper, we aim
at taking a step further towards Android malware detec-
tion with automatic representation learning. To achieve
this aim, we leverage deep learning techniques and only
consider the raw API method calls from Android DEX
files for the purpose of malware detection and attribution
with automatic feature extraction.
2.2. Threat Model and Assumptions
We position MalDozer as an anti-malware system that
detects Android malware and attributes it to a known
family with a high accuracy and minimal false positive
and negative rates. We assume that the analyzed Android
apps, whether malicious or benign, are developed mainly
in Java or any other language that is translated to DEX
bytecode. Therefore, Android apps developed by other
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means, e.g., web-based, are out of the scope of the cur-
rent design of MalDozer. Also, we assume that apps’ core
functionalities are in the DEX bytecode and not in C/C++
native code [17], i.e., the attacker is mainly using the DEX
bytecode for the malicious payload. Furthermore, we as-
sume that MalDozer detection results could not be affected
by malicious activities. In the case of a server, Android
malicious apps have no effect on the server system. How-
ever, in the case of deployment on infected mobiles or IoT
devices, MalDozer should be protected from malicious ac-
tivities to avoid tampering its results.
2.3. Usage Scenarios
The effectiveness of MalDozer, i.e., its high accuracy,
makes it a suitable choice for malware detection in large-
scale app store systems, especially that its update only
requires very minimal manual intervention. We only need
to train MalDozer model on new samples without a feature
engineering, since MalDozer can automatically extract and
learn the malicious and benign features during the train-
ing. Notice that MalDozer could detect unknown malware
based on our evaluation as presented in Section 7. Fur-
thermore, due to the efficiency of MalDozer, it could be
deployed on mobile devices such as phones and tablets.
As for mobile devices, MalDozer acts as a detection com-
ponent in the anti-malware system, where the goal is to
scan new apps. The family attribution is very handy when
detecting new malware apps. Indeed, MalDozer helps the
anti-malware system to take the necessary precautions and
actions based on the malware family, which could have
some specific malicious threats such as ransomware. It
is also important to mention that we were able to run
MalDozer on resource-limited IoT devices considered by
Android Things such as Raspberry PI [12].
2.4. Android Architecture
Android has been settled by the Android Open Source
Project (AOSP) team, maintained by Google and sup-
ported by the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) [18]. It en-
compasses the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs),
chip-makers, carriers and application developers. Android
apps are written in Java. However, the native code and
shared libraries are generally developed in C/C++ [17].
The current Android architecture [19] consists of a Linux
kernel, which is designed for an embedded environment
consisting of limited resources. On top of the Linux ker-
nel, there is a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), which
provides standard interfaces that expose device hardware
capabilities to the higher-level Java API framework, by al-
lowing programmers to create software hooks between the
Android platform stack and the hardware. There is also
Android Runtime (ART), which is an application runtime
environment used by the Android OS. It replaced Dalvik
starting from Android 5.0. ART translates the app’s byte-
code into native instructions that are later executed by the
device’s runtime environment. ART introduces the ahead-
of-time (AOT) compilation feature, which allows compil-
ing entire applications into native machine code upon their
installation. The native libraries developed in C/C++
support high-performance third-party reusable shared li-
braries. The Java API Framework provides APIs form the
building blocks the user need to create Android apps. The
System Apps, are the apps hat are included within the
system, and are required to make the device run.
2.4.1. Android APK Format
Android Application Package (APK ) is the file format
adopted by Android for apps distribution and installation.
It comes as a ZIP archive file, which contains all the com-
ponents needed to run the app. By analogy, APK files
are similar to Windows EXE installation files or Linux
RPM /DEB files. The APK package is organized into dif-
ferent directories (namely lib, res, and assets) and files
(namely AndroidManifest.xml and classes.dex). More
precisely, i) The AndroidManifest.xml file contains the
app meta-data, e.g., name, version, required permissions,
and used libraries. ii) The classes.dex file contains the com-
piled Java classes. iii) The lib directory stores C/C++
native libraries [17]. iv) The resources directory (res) con-
tains the non-source code files, such as video, image, and
audio files, which are packaged during compilation.
3. Methodology
In this section, we present MalDozer framework and
its components (Figure 1). MalDozer has a simple design,
where a minimalistic preprocessing is employed to get the
assembly methods. As for the feature extraction (represen-
tation learning) and detection/attribution, they are based
on the actual neural network. This permits MalDozer to
be very efficient with fast preprocessing and neural net-
work execution. Since MalDozer is based on a supervised
machine learning, we first need to train our model. Af-
terward, we deploy this model along with a preprocessing
procedure on the targeted devices. Notice that the pre-
processing procedure is common between the training and
the deployment phases to ensure the correctness of the
detection results (Figure 1).
1- Extraction of API Method Calls. MalDozer workflow
starts by extracting the sequences of API calls from An-
droid app packages, in which we consider only the DEX
file. We disassemble the classes.dex to produce the Dalvik
VM assembly. Our goal is to formalize the assembly to
keep the maximum raw information with minimum noise.
Notice here that we could use Android APIs (such as
android/net/ConnectivityManager in Figure 2) instead
of permission to have a granular view that helps distin-
guishing a malware app.
However, quantifying Android API could be noisy be-
cause there are plenty of common API calls shared be-
tween apps. Some solutions tend to filter only dangerous
3
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Figure 1: Approach Overview
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Figure 2: Android API from a Malware Sample
APIs and use them for detection. In this case, we require
a manual categorization of dangerous APIs. Moreover,
Android API gives an abstract view of the actual mali-
cious activity that could deceive the malware detection.
For this reason, we leverage Android API method calls as
android/net/ConnectivityManager;-> getNetworkInfo
in Figure 3. By doing so, the malware detector will have
a more granular view of the app activity. In our case, we
address this problem from another angle; we treat Android
apps as a sequence of API method calls. We consider all
the API calls with no filtering, where the order is part of
the information we use to identify malware. It represents
the temporal relationship between two API method calls
(in a given basic block), and defines the intended sub-tasks
of the app. The sequence of API method calls preserves
the temporal relationship over individual basic blocks of
the linear disassembly and ignores the order between these
blocks. The obtained result is a merged sequence (Figure
1).
android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getNetworkInfo
android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getAllNetworkInfo
android/telephony/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage
android/telephony/SmsManager;->sendMultipartTextMessage
android/location/LocationManager;->getLastKnownLocation
android/location/LocationManager;->getBestProvider
Figure 3: Granular View using API Method Calls
In other words, a DEX file, denoted by cd, is composed
of a set of n compiled Java classes, cd = {cl1, · · · , cln}.
Each Java class cli is, in turn, composed of a set of m
methods, which are basic blocks, cli = {mti1 · · · ,mtim}.
By going down to the API method level, mtij is a sequence
of k API method calls, Formally mtij = (P
i,j
1 , · · · , P i,jk ) ,
where P i,jl is the l
th API method call in method mtij .
Algorithm 1: Extraction
Input : cd: Java Assembly
Output: MSeq: Methods Sequence
begin
MSeq = EmptyList();
foreach cl ∈ cd do
foreach mt ∈ cl do
foreach P ∈ mt do
MSeq.Add(p);
end
end
end
return MSeq;
end
2- Discretization of API Method Calls. In this step, we
discretize the sequences of API method calls that are in
an Android app (Algorithm 2). More precisely, we re-
place each API method with an identifier, resulting in a
sequence of numbers. We also build a dictionary that maps
each API call to its identifier. Notice that in the current
implementation, the mapping dictionary is deployed with
the learning model to map the API calls of the analyzed
apps. In the deployment, we could find unknown API calls
4
related to third party libraries. To overcome this problem:
(i) We consider a big dataset that covers most of the API
calls. (ii) In the deployment phase, we replace unknown
API calls with fixed identifiers. Afterward, we unify the
length of the sequences L (hyperparameter) and pad a
given sequence with zeros if its length l < L.
Algorithm 2: Discretization
Input : MSeq: Methods Sequence
MapDict: Mapping Dict
Output: DSeq: Discrete Sequence
begin
DSeq = EmptyList();
foreach P ∈MSeq do
if m ∈MapDict.Keys() then
Dvalue←MapDict[P ];
DSeq.Add(Dvalue);
else
Dvalue← 0;
DSeq.Add(Dvalue);
end
end
return DSeq;
end
3- Unification of the Sequences’ Size. The length of the
sequences varies from one app to another. Hence, it is im-
portant to unify the length of the sequences. There are
two cases depending on the length of the sequence and
the hyper-parameter. We choose a uniform sequence size
as follows: i) If the length of a given sequence is greater
than the uniform sequence size L, we take only the first
L items to represent the apps. ii) In case the length of
the sequence is less than L, we pad the sequence with ze-
ros. It is important to mention that the uniform sequence
size hyper-parameter has an influence on the accuracy of
MalDozer. A simple rule is that the larger is the size, the
better is, but this will require a lot of computation power
and a long time to train the neural network.
3- Generation of the Semantic Vectors.. The identifier in
the sequences needs to be shaped to fit as input to our
neural network. This could be solved by representing each
identifier by a vector. The question that arises is how
are such vectors produced? A straightforward solution is
to use one-hot vectors, where a vector has one in the in-
terface value row, and zero in the rest. Such a vector is
very sparse because its size is equal to the number of API
calls, which makes it impractically and computationally
prohibitive for the training and the deployment. To ad-
dress this issue, we resort to a dense vector that uses a con-
tinuous space. These vectors are semantically related, and
we could express their relation by computing a distance.
The smaller the distance is, the more related the vectors
are (i.e., the API calls). We describe word embedding in
Section 4. The output of this step is sequences of vectors
for each app that keeps the order of the original API calls;
each vector has a fixed size K (hyper-parameter).
4- Prediction using a Neural Network. The final compo-
nent in MalDozer framework is the neural network, which
is composed of several layers. The number of layers and
the complexity of the model are hyper-parameters. How-
ever, we aim to keep the neural network model as simple
as possible to gain in the execution time during its deploy-
ment, especially on IoT devices. In our design, we rely on
the convolution layers [20] to automatically discover the
pattern in the raw method calls. The input to the neural
network is a sequence of vectors, i.e., a matrix of L × K
shape. In the training phase, we train the neural net-
work parameters (layers weight) based on the app vector
sequence and its labels: (i) malware or benign for the de-
tection task, and (ii) malware families for the attribution
task. In the deployment phase, we extract the sequence of
methods and use the embedding model to produce the vec-
tor sequence. Finally, the neural network takes the vector
sequence to decide about the given Android app.
4. MalDozer Method Embedding
The neural network takes vectors as input. Therefore,
we represent our Android API method calls as vectors. As
a result, we formalize an Android app as a sequence of
vectors with fixed size (L). We could use one-hot vector.
However, its size is the number of unique API method calls
in our dataset. This makes such a solution not scalable to
large-scale training. Also, the word embedding technique
outperforms the results of the one-hot vector technique
in our case [16], [21], [20]. Therefore, we seek a compact
vector, which also has a semantic value. To fulfill these
requirements, we choose the word embedding techniques,
namely, word2vec [16] and GloVe [21]. Our primary goal is
to have a dense vector for each Android API method that
keeps track of its contexts in a large dataset of Android
apps. Thus, in contrast with one-hot vectors, each word
embedding vector contains a numerical summary of the
Android API call meaning representation. Moreover, we
could apply geometric techniques on the API call vectors
to measure the semantic relationship between their func-
tionalities, i.e., developers tend to use certain API method
calls in the same context. In our context, we learn these
vectors from our dataset that contains benign and mali-
cious apps by using word2vec [16]. The latter is a com-
putationally efficient predictive model from learning word
embedding vectors, which are applied on the raw Android
API method calls. The output obtained from training the
embedding word model is a matrix K × A, where K is
the size of the embedding vector, and A is the number
of unique Android API method calls. Both K and A are
hyper-parameters; we use K = 64 in all our models. In
contrast, the hyper-parameter A is a major factor in the
accuracy of MalDozer. The more API calls we consider,
the more accurate and robust our model is. Notice that,
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our word embedding is trained along with the neural net-
work, where we tune both of them for a given task such
as detection. Despite that, it can be trained separately
to generate the embedding word vector independently of
the detection task. In the deployment phase (Figure 1),
MalDozer uses the word embedding model and looks up for
each API method call identifier to find the corresponding
embedding vector .
5. MalDozer Neural Network
MalDozer neural network is inspired by [20], where the
authors use a neural network for sentence classification
task such as sentiment analysis. The proposed architec-
ture shows high results and outperforms many of state-
of-the-art benchmarks with a relatively simple neural net-
work design. Here, we raise the following questions: Why
could such a Natural Language Processing (NLP) model
be useful in Android malware detection? And why do we
choose to build it on top of this design [20]? We formu-
late our answers as follows: i) NLP is a challenging field
where we deal with text. So, there is an enormous number
of vocabularies; also we could express the same meaning
in different ways. We also have the same semantics with
many combinations of words, which we call the natural
language obfuscation. In our context, we deal with se-
quences of Android API method calls and want to find the
combination of patterns of method calls, which produces
the same (malicious) activity. We use the API method
calls as they appear in the binary, i.e., there is a tem-
poral relationship between API methods in basic blocks
but we ignore the order among these blocks. By analogy
to NLP, the basic blocks are the sentences and the API
method calls are the words. Further, the app (paragraph)
is a list of basic blocks (unordered sentences). This task
looks easier compared to the NLP one because of the huge
difference in the vocabulary, i.e., the number of Android
API method calls is significantly less than the number of
words in natural language. Also, the combination in the
NLP is much complex compared to Android API calls.
ii) We choose to use this model due to its efficiency and
ability to run our model on resource-constrained devices.
Table 1 depicts the neural network architecture of Mal-
Dozer’s detection and attribution tasks. Both networks
are very similar; the only notable difference is in the out-
put layer. In the detection task, we need only one neuron
in the output layer because the network decides whether
the app is malware or not. As for the attribution task,
there are multiple neurons, one for each Android malware
family. Having the same architecture for the detection and
attribution makes the development and the evaluation of
a given design more simple. Because the network archi-
tecture achieves good results in one task, it will have very
similar results in the other one. As presented in Figure 4,
the first layer is a convolution layer [20] with rectified lin-
ear unit (ReLU) activation function (f(x) = max(0, x)).
Afterward, we use global max pool [20] and connect it to a
fully-connected layer. Notice that in addition to Dropout
[22] used to prevent overfitting, we also utilize Benchnor-
malization [22] to improve our results. Finally, we have
an output layer, where the number of neurons depends on
the detection or attribution tasks.
l
# Layers Options Activ
1 Convolution Filter=512, FilterSize=3 ReLU
2 MaxPooling / /
3 FC #Neurons=256, Dropout=0.5 ReLU
4 FC #Neurons={1,#Families1} Softmax
1 The number of malware families in the training dataset.
Table 1: MalDozer Malware Neural Network
Server (1/2) Laptop Raspberry PI 2
GPU TITAN X / no no no
CPU Intel E5-2630 Intel T6400 ARM Cortex A7
RAM 128GB 3GB 1GB
Table 2: Hardware Specifications
6. Implementation
In this section, we present the software & hardware
components of MalDozer evaluation.
Software. We implement MalDozer using Python and Bash
scripting languages. First, Python zip library extracts the
DEX file from the APK file. We use dexdump command-
line to produce the assembly from the DEX file. Dexdump
is available through the Android SDK, but in the case of
Raspberry PI, we built it from its source code. Regular ex-
pressions are employed to extract API method calls from
the assembly. To develop the neural network, we use Ten-
sorflow [23]. Notice that there is no optimization in the
preprocessing; in the run-time evaluation, we use only a
single thread app.
Hardware. To evaluate the efficiency of MalDozer, we eval-
uate multiple types of hardware, as shown in Table 2, start-
ing from servers to Raspberry PI [12]. For training, the
Graphic Processing Unit (GPU) is a vital component be-
cause the neural network training needs immense compu-
tational power. The training takes hours under NVIDIA
TitanX. However, the deployment could be virtually on
any device including IoT devices. To this end, we consider
Raspberry PI as IoT device because it is one of the hard-
ware platforms supported by Android Things [9]. We also
use low-end laptops in our evaluation, as shown in Table
2.
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7. Evaluation
In this section, we conduct our‘ evaluation using dif-
ferent datasets that primarily cover the following perfor-
mance aspects:
• (I) Detection Performance: We evaluate how effec-
tively MalDozer can distinguish between malicious
and benign apps in terms of F1-measure, precision,
recall, and false positive rate.
• (II) Attribution Performance: We evaluate how ef-
fectively MalDozer can correctly attribute a given
malicious app to its malware family.
• (III) Runtime Performance: We measure the prepro-
cessing and the detection runtime on different types
of hardware.
7.1. Evaluation Metrics
The evaluation results are presented under the follow-
ing metrics:
• True positives (TP): This metric measures the num-
ber of malicious apps that are successfully detected.
• False negatives (FN): This metric measures the num-
ber of malicious apps that are incorrectly classified.
• False positives (FP): This metric measures the num-
ber of benign apps that are incorrectly classified.
• Precision (P): It is the percentage of positive pre-
diction, i.e., the percentage of the detected malware
out of all sample apps. Formally, P = TPTP+FP
• Recall (R): It is the percentage of correct malicious
apps detected out of all malware samples. Formally,
R = TPTP+FN
• F1-Score (F1): It is a measure that considers preci-
sion and recall. Formally, F1 = 2 x P xRP+R .
We also measure False Positive Rate (FPR), False Neg-
ative Rate (FNR) and Accuracy (ACC), which are given
as follows:
FPR = FPFP+TP , FNR =
FN
FN+TP , ACC =
TP+TN
P+N
7.2. Datasets
In our evaluation, we have two main tasks: i) Detec-
tion, which aims at checking if a given app is malware or
not, ii) Attribution, which aims at determining the family
of the detected malware. We conduct the evaluation ex-
periments under two types of datasets: i) Mixed dataset,
which contains malicious apps and benign apps, as pre-
sented in Table 3. ii) Malware dataset, which contains only
malware, as shown in Table 4. As for the malware dataset,
we leverage reference datasets such as Malgenome [13] and
Drebin [24]. We also collect two other datasets from differ-
ent sources, e.g., virusshare.com, Contagio Minidump [25].
The total number of malware samples is 33K, including
Malgenome and Drebin datasets. As for the attribution
task, we use only malware from the previous datasets,
where each family has at least 40 samples, as presented
in Tables 13, 14, 15. To this end, we propose MalDozer
dataset, as in Table 13, which contains 20K malware sam-
ples from 32 malware families. We envision to make Mal-
Dozer dataset available upon request for the research com-
munity. The benign app samples have been collected from
Playdrone dataset [26]. We leverage the top 38K apps
that are ranked by the number of downloads.
7.3. Malware Detection Performance
We evaluate MalDozer on different cross-validation set-
tings, two, three, five and ten-fold, to examine the de-
tection performance under different training/test set per-
centages (50%, 66%, 80%, 90%) from the actual dataset (10
training epochs). Table 5 depicts the detection results
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Dataset #Malware #Benign Total
Malgenome 1,258 37,627 38.885
Drebin 5,555 37,627 43,182
MalDozer 20,089 37,627 57,716
All 33,066 37,627 70,693
Table 3: Datasets for Detection Task
Dataset #Malware #Family
Malgenome 985 9
Drebin 4,661 20
MalDozer 20,089 32
Table 4: Datasets for Attribution Task
on Malgenome dataset. MalDozer achieves excellent re-
sults, F1-Score=99.84%, with a small False Positive Rate
(FPR), 0.04%, despite the unbalanced dataset, where be-
nign app samples are the most dominant in the dataset.
The detection results are similar under all cross-validation
settings. Table 6 presents the detection results on Drebin
dataset, which are very similar to the Malgenome ones.
MalDozer reaches F1-Score=99.21%, with FPR=0.45%. Sim-
ilar detection results are shown in Table 7 on MalDozer
dataset ( F1-Score=98.18% and FPR=1.15%). Table 8
shows the results related to all datasets, where MalDozer
achieves a good result (F1-Score=96.33%). However, it
has a higher false positive rate compared to the previous
results (FPR=3.19%). This leads us to manually investi-
gate the false postives. We discover, by correlating with
virusTotal.com, that several false positive apps are already
detected by many vendors as malware.
F1% P% R% FPR%
2-Fold 99.6600 99.6620 99.6656 0.06
3-Fold 98.1926 98.6673 97.9812 1.97
5-Fold 99.8044 99.8042 99.8045 0.09
10-Fold 99.8482 99.8474 99.8482 0.04
Table 5: Detection on Malgenome Dataset
F1% P% R% FPR%
2-Fold 98.8834 98.9015 98.9000 0.13
3-Fold 99.0142 99.0130 99.01579 0.51
5-Fold 99.1174 99.1173 99.1223 0.31
10-Fold 99.2173 99.2173 99.2172 0.45
Table 6: Detection on Drebin Dataset
7.3.1. Unknown Malware Detection
Although MalDozer demonstrates very good detection
results, some questions still arise: (i) Can MalDozer de-
tect samples of unknown malware families? And (ii) How
F1% P% R% FPR%
2-Fold 96.8576 96.9079 96.8778 1.01
3-Fold 97.6229 97.6260 97.6211 2.00
5-Fold 97.7804 97.7964 97.7753 2.25
10-Fold 98.1875 98.1876 98.1894 1.15
Table 7: Detection on MalDozer Dataset
F1% P% R% FPR%
2-Fold 96.0708 96.0962 96.0745 2.53
3-Fold 95.0252 95.0252 95.0278 4.01
5-Fold 96.3326 96.3434 96.3348 2.67
10-Fold 96.2958 96.2969 96.2966 3.19
Table 8: Detection on All Dataset
many samples are needed for a given family to achieve a
good accuracy? To answer these questions, we conduct the
following experiment on Drebin mixed dataset (Malware
+ Benign), where we focus on top malware families (i.e.,
BaseBridge, DroidKungFu, FakeInstaller, GinMaster, Op-
fake, Plankton). For each family, we train (5 epochs) our
model on a subset dataset, which does not include sam-
ples of that family. These samples are used as a test set.
Afterward, we train with few samples from the family and
evaluate the model on the rest of them. Progressively, we
add more samples to the training and assess the accuracy
of our model on detecting the rest of the family samples.
Answering the above questions: (i) Can MalDozer detect
unknown malware family samples? Yes, Figure 5 shows
the accuracy versus the number of samples in the training
dataset. We see that MalDozer (zero sample vs. accuracy)
could detect the unknown malware family sample without
previous training. The accuracy varies from 60% to 90%.
(ii) How many samples for a given family to achieve a
good accuracy? MalDozer needs only about 10 to 20 sam-
ples to reach 90% (Figure 5). In the case of DroidKungFu,
MalDozer needs 20 samples to reach 90%. Considering 10
to 20 samples from a malware family is relatively a small
number to get high results.
7.3.2. Resiliency Against API Evolution over Time
As we have seen in the previous section, MalDozer could
detect new malware samples from unknown families us-
ing samples from Drebin dataset collected in the period of
2011/2012. In this section, we aim to answer the follow-
ing quastion: Can MalDozer detect malicious and bengin
apps collected in different years?To answer this question,
we evalute MalDozer on four datasets collected from [27]
of four consecutive years: 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, as
shown in Table 9, where, we train MalDozer in one year
dataset and test it on the rest of the datasets. The re-
sults show that MalDozer detection is more resilient to API
evolution over time compare to [28], as presented in Fig-
ure 6. Starting with 2013 dataset (Figure 6(a)), we train
MalDozer on 2013 samples and evaluate it on 2014, 2015,
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Figure 5: Evaluation of Unknown Malware Detection
and 2016 ones. We notice a high detection rate in 2014
dataset since it is collected in the consecutive year of the
training datset. However, the detection rate decreases in
2015 and 2016 datasets but it is above an acceptable de-
tection rate (F1-Score=70%). Similarly, we obtained the
results of 2014 dataset, as depicted in Figure 6(b). Also,
training MalDozer on 2015 or 2016 datasets exhibits very
good results under all the datasets collected in other years,
where we reach F1-Score=90-92.5%.
Dataset 2013 2014 2015 2016
#Malware 10k 10k 10k 10k
#Bengin 10k 10k 10k 10k
Table 9: Datasets for API Evolution Over Time Resiliency
7.3.3. Resiliency against changing the order of API meth-
ods
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of MalDozer
against changing in the order of API method calls. The lat-
ter could change for various reasons, for example: (i) We
could use different dissassembly tools in the production,
(ii) A malware developer could repackage the same ma-
licious app multiple times. The previous scenarios could
lead to losing the temporal relations among the API calls.
In case of the malware developer, he/she will be limited
by keeping the same malicious semantics in the app. To
validate the robustness of MalDozer against such meth-
ods order, we conduct the following experiment. First, we
train our model on the training dataset. Afterward, we
randomly shuffle the sequence of API method calls in the
test dataset. We divide the testing app sequence into N
blocks, then shuffle them and evaluate the F1-Score. We
repeat until N is equal to the number of sequences, i.e.,
one API call in each block. The result of this experiment is
shown in Figure 7. The latter depicts the F1-Score versus
the number of blocks, starting with four blocks and ending
with 15K blocks, where each block contains one API call.
Figure 7 demonstrates the resiliency of MalDozer against
changing the order of API method calls. We observe that
even with completely random individual API method calls,
MalDozer achieves 93%.
7.4. Family Attribution Performance
Family attribution is an important task for Android
security, where MalDozer distinguishes itself from the ex-
isting malware detection solutions, since only few solu-
tions provide this functionality. Starting with Malgenome
dataset, MalDozer achieves a very good result, i.e., F1-
Score of 99.18%. Similarly, MalDozer reaches an F1-Score
of 98% on Drebin dataset. The results per malware family
attribution performance for Malgnome and Drebin are pre-
sented in Tables 14 and 15. MalDozer achieves good results
in the case of MalDozer dataset, F1-Score of 85%. Our in-
terpretation of this result comes from Tables 13, 14 and 15,
which depict the detailed results per malware family. For
example, the family agent unveils poor results because of
the misslabeling, since agent is a common name for many
Android malware families. We believe that there is a lot of
noise in the family labeling of the MalDozer dataset since
we leverage only one security vendor for labeling. Despite
this fact, MalDozer demonstrates acceptable results and
robustness (Appendix Figure A.13).
F1% P% R%
2-Fold 98.9834 99.0009 98.9847
3-Fold 98.9910 99.0026 98.9847
5-Fold 99.0907 99.1032 99.0862
10-Fold 99.1873 99.1873 99.1878
Table 10: Attribution on Malgenome
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F1% P% R%
2-Fold 98.1192 98.1401 98.1334
3-Fold 98.6882 98.6998 98.6912
5-Fold 98.5824 98.5961 98.5839
10-Fold 98.5198 98.5295 98.5196
Table 11: Attribution on Drebin
7.5. Run-Time Performance
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of MalDozer,
i.e., the runtime during the deployment phase. We divide
the runtime into two parts: i) Preprocessing time: the re-
quired time to extract and preprocess the sequences of An-
droid API method calls. ii) Detection time: time needed
to make the prediction about a given sequence of API
F1% P% R%
2-Fold 89.3331 89.5044 89.3424
3-Fold 81.8742 82.7565 81.8109
5-Fold 83.8518 84.1360 84.0061
10-Fold 85.5233 85.6184 85.8479
Table 12: Attribution on MalDozer
method calls. We analyze the detection time on the model
complexity of different hardware. Figure 11(a) depicts the
average preprocessing time along with its standard devia-
tion, related to each hardware. The server machines and
the laptop spend, on average, 1 second in the preprocess-
ing time, which is very acceptable for production. Also,
as mentioned previously, we do not optimize the current
preprocessing workflow. In the IoT device [12], the pre-
processing takes, on average, about 4 seconds, which is
more than acceptable for such a small device. Figure 11(b)
presents the detection time on average that is related to
each hardware. First, it is noticeable that the standard
deviation is very negligible, i.e., the detection time is con-
stant for all apps. Also, the detection time is very low
for all the devices. As for the IoT device, the detection
time is only 1.3 seconds. Therefore, the average time that
MalDozer needs to decide for a given app is 5.3 seconds on
average in case of IoT device, as we know that the pre-
processing takes most of the time (4/5.3). Here, we ask
the following two questions: (i) Which part in the pre-
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Malware Family #Sample F1-Score
01 FakeInst 4822 96.15%
02 Dowgin 2248 84.24%
03 SmsPay 1544 81.61%
04 Adwo 1495 87.79%
05 SMSSend 1088 81.48%
06 Wapsx 833 78.85%
07 Plankton 817 94.18%
08 Agent 778 51.45%
09 SMSReg 687 80.61%
10 GingerMaster 533 76.39%
11 Kuguo 448 78.28%
12 HiddenAds 426 84.20%
13 Utchi 397 93.99%
14 Youmi 355 72.39%
15 Iop 344 93.09%
16 BaseBridge 341 90.50%
17 DroidKungFu 314 85.85%
18 SmsSpy 279 85.05%
19 FakeApp 278 93.99%
20 InfoStealer 253 82.82%
21 Kmin 222 91.03%
22 HiddenApp 214 76.71%
23 AppQuanta 202 99.26%
24 Dropper 195 77.11%
25 MobilePay 144 78.74%
26 FakeDoc 140 96.38%
27 Mseg 138 55.38%
28 SMSKey 130 81.03%
29 RATC 111 84.81%
30 Geinimi 106 95.58%
31 DDLight 104 90.55%
32 GingerBreak 103 84.87%
Table 13: MalDozer Android Malware Dataset
Malware Family #Sample F1-Score
01 DroidKungFu3 309 99.83%
02 AnserverBot 187 99.19%
03 BaseBridge 121 98.37%
04 DroidKungFu4 96 99.88%
05 Geinimi 69 97.81%
06 Pjapps 58 95.65%
07 KMin 52 99.99%
08 GoldDream 47 99.96%
09 DroidDreamLight 46 99.99%
Table 14: Malgenome Attribution Dataset
processing needs optimization? (ii) Does the preprocessing
time depend on the size of APK or DEX file? To answer
these questions, we randomly select 1K benign apps and
1K malware apps. We measure the preprocessing time and
correlate it with the size of APK and DEX files. Figure 8
shows the experimentation results in the case of the IoT
device [12]. The scattered charts depict the preprocess-
Malware Family #Sample F1-Score
01 FakeInstaller 925 99.51%
02 DroidKungFu 666 98.79%
03 Plankton 625 99.11%
04 Opfake 613 99.34%
05 GinMaster 339 97.92%
06 BaseBridge 329 97.56%
07 Iconosys 152 99.02%
08 Kmin 147 99.31%
09 FakeDoc 132 99.24%
10 Geinimi 92 97.26%
11 Adrd 91 96.13%
12 DroidDream 81 98.13%
13 Glodream 69 90.14%
14 MobileTx 69 91.97%
15 ExploitLinuxLotoor 69 99.97%
16 FakeRun 61 95.16%
17 SendPay 59 99.14%
18 Gappusin 58 97.43%
19 Imlog 43 98.85%
20 SMSreg 41 92.30%
Table 15: Drebin Attribution Dataset
ing time along with the size of the APK or DEX file for
the mixed, only-benign, and only-malware datasets. From
Figure 8, it is clear that the preprocessing time is linearly
related to the size of the DEX file. We perform the same
experiment on Server and Laptop, and we get very similar
results, as shown in Figures 9 and 10. Finally, we notice
that the size of benign apps tend to be bigger than the ma-
licious apps. Thus, the preprocessing time of the benign
apps is longer.
#Params F1% Word2Vec Size
Model 01 6.6 Million 98.95 100k
Model 02 4.6 Million 95.84 70k
Model 03 3.4 Million 93.81 50k
Model 04 1.5 Million 90.08 20k
Table 16: Model Complexity vs Detection Performance
7.5.1. Model Complexity Evaluation
In this section, we examine the effect of model com-
plexity on the detection time. By model complexity, we
mean the number of parameters in the model, as depicted
in Table 16. Many hyper-parameters could influence the
complex nature of the model, but we primarily consider
the word2vec embedding size. The latter is very impor-
tant for the detection of the model, especially if we have a
big dataset. Table 16 demonstrates the complexity of the
model versus the F1-Score. It is noticeable that the larger
the number of parameters is, the more its performance in-
creases. Based on our observation, bigger models are more
accurate and more robust to changes, as will be discussed
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Figure 8: Preprocessing Time vs APK and DEX Sizes (IoT device)
in Section 8. Finally, Figure 12 displays the execution time
of the models in Table 16 on the IoT device. The detailed
execution related to all the hardware is presented in Figure
12.
8. Discussion and Limitations
In this paper, we have explored a new approach to
capture Android apps behaviors using neural networks on
API method calls. This approach achieves highly accurate
malware detection and family attribution. Our detection
technique is sample-based, i.e., the system could automat-
ically recognize patterns in the training phase of new mal-
ware as well as benign apps from raw sequences of API
method calls. Therefore, this allows our system to catch
up with the rapid evolution of Android OS and malicious
techniques by training it on the raw sequence of API meth-
ods of new apps, which contain a lot of information about
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Figure 9: Preprocessing Time vs APK and Dex Sizes (Laptop)
the app’s behaviors. Yet, this sequence is less affected
by the obfuscation techniques. Furthermore, our work
pushes toward portable detection solutions, i.e., the solu-
tion should be used in app stores, mobile or IoT devices. A
portable solution is a step towards ubiquitous security that
enhances small devices security. In this context, MalDozer
could resist to certain obfuscation techniques because we
only consider the API method calls. However, like all the
detection schemes that are based on static analysis, Mal-
Dozer is not resilient against dynamic code loading and re-
flection obfuscation, where the app downloads a malicious
code and executes it at runtime. Moreover, MalDozer does
not consider native codes. Finally, MalDozer uses many
hyper-parameters for its deep learning model. The impact
of using a lower number on accuracy detection and running
time performance can be the subject of further investiga-
tions in future work. This work could also be extended
to study the effect of a larger number of API method
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Figure 10: Preprocessing Time vs APK and Dex Sizes (Server)
calls on detection accuracy, training time, and detection
time. Furthermore, we plan to extend MalDozer to sup-
port the processing of native codes. In this context, Mal-
Dozer could resist certain obfuscation techniques because
we only consider the API call methods. However, Mal-
Dozer is not immune to obfuscation (inherited from static
analysis drawbacks) such as the use of reflection/dynamic
code execution, as well as, other obfuscation techniques
that rely on native code and non-framework service calls.
9. Related work
The Android malware analysis techniques can be clas-
sified as: static analysis, dynamic analysis, or hybrid anal-
ysis. The static analysis methods [24], [29], [30], [28], [31],
[32], [33], [34], use static features that are extracted from
the app, such as: requested permissions and APIs to de-
tect malicious app. Some of these methods are generally
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Figure 11: Run-Time vs. Hardware
not resistant to obfuscation. The dynamic analysis meth-
ods [35], [36], [37], [38],[39], [40], [41], [42] aim to identify
behavioral signature or behavioral anomaly of the running
app. These methods are more resistant to obfuscation. On
the other hand, the dynamic methods offer limited scala-
bility as they incur additional cost in terms of process-
ing and memory. The hybrid analysis methods [43], [44],
[45], [46], [47] combine between both analyses to improve
detection accuracy, which costs additional computational
cost. Assuming that malicious apps of the same family
share similar features, some methods [48], [49], [50], [51],
[52], [53], [54], [55]. measure the similarity between the
features of two samples (similar malicious code). Some
methods [56], [57], [58] employ semantics-aware features
such as control-flow graphs [59], data dependency graphs
[60] and class dependence graphs [50]. The deep learning
techniques are more suitable than conventional machine
learning techniques for Android malware detection [43].
Research work on deep learning for Android malare de-
tection are recently getting more attention [43], [61], [62],
[63]. Differently from the existing deep learning solutions,
MalDozer offers many advantages: (i) MalDozer provide
automatic feature engineering for new types of malware
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Figure 12: Detection Time vs Model Complexity
in the training phase. (ii) MalDozer uses a minimal pro-
processing, which fits small devices deployment. (iii) In
addition to its high detection performance, MalDozer is
able to attribute malware to its actual family with similar
performance.
9.1. MalDozer vs. MAMADroid
In this section, we highlight the differences between
MalDozer and MAMADroid [28], a recent and competi-
tive malware detection solution that combines semantics-
aware static features and machine learning. MAMADroid
uses the sequence of abstracted API calls to build a be-
havioral model in the form of a Markov chain. The latter
is used to extract features and perform classification. We
compare our framework with MAMADroid with respect to
the following points: (1) Deployment: Due to its large
memory requirements, MAMADroid can only be deployed
on high-power servers. In contrast, the detection compo-
nent of MalDozer can efficiently run under multiple deploy-
ment architectures, including high-power and low-power
machines as well as mobile and IoT devices. (2) Design
complexity: The design of MAMADroid is complex since
its preprocessing phase is composed of many steps. MA-
MADroid first constructs a call graph using flow-analysis
tools such as: Soot [64] and FlowDroid [65]. Soot converts
the DEX file into Jimple and FlowDroid is used for Taint
analysis. Next, the constructed graph is used to generate
the sequence of abstracted API calls, which are used to
build a Markov chain. MalDozer, on the other hand, ex-
tracts the raw sequence of API method calls directly from
the DEX file without any additional preprocessisng over-
head. (3) Adaptation to new APIs: In MAMADroid,
the release of new Android OS version with a new set of
APIs implies that a manual intervention is needed to craft
a new Markov model, and manually redefine the set of
APIs to be fed to the classifier. MalDozer can automat-
ically learn the new APIs directly from the DEX file, as
they have a specific known format. (4)Approach per-
formance: MAMADroid consumes a very large amount
of memory (16GB of RAM) to extract the call graph from
the app. Despite that, the graph extraction phase takes, in
average, 25.4 seconds, and a maximum of 18 minutes. Mal-
Dozer is very lightweight. The average time to extract the
features and classify the app in MalDozer is 5.3 seconds on
the most resource-constrained IoT device. (5)Ability to
analyze apks: The Soot tool, used by MAMADroid, fails
to process 4.6% of the apps in the dataset of 43, 940 apps,
which counts for more than 2, 000 apps. Such a failure
does not happen in the case of MalDozer due to its simple
preprocess. The above-discussed points clearly show the
outperformance of MalDozer over MAMADroid.
10. Conclusion
We have presented MalDozer, an automatic, efficient
and effective Android malware detection and attribution
system. MalDozer relies on deep learning techniques and
raw sequences of API method calls in order to identify
Android malware. We have evaluated MalDozer on several
small and large datasets, including Malgenome, Drebin,
and our MalDozer dataset, in addition to a dataset of be-
nign apps downloaded from Google Play. The evaluation
14
results show that MalDozer is highly accurate in terms
of malware detection as well as their attribution to cor-
responding families. Moreover, MalDozer can efficiently
run under multiple deployment architectures, ranging from
servers to small IoT devices. This work represents a step
towards practical, automatic and effective Android mal-
ware detection and family attribution.
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Appendix A. Confusion Matrices
2 Fold 3 Fold
PB1 PM PB PM
AB2 37,604 23 AB 36,882 745
AM 107 1,151 AM 40 1,218
5 Fold 10 Fold
PB PM PB PM
AB 37,591 36 AB 37,612 15
AM 40 1,218 AM 44 1,214
1 PB: Predicted Benign, PM: Predicted Malware
2 AB: Actual Benign, PM: Actual Malware
Table A.17: Detailed Detection Result on Malgenome
2 Fold 3 Fold
PB1 PM PB PM
AB2 37,578 49 AB 37,435 192
AM 426 5,129 AM 233 5,322
5 Fold 10 Fold
PB PM PB PM
AB 37,509 118 AB 37,457 170
AM 261 5,294 AM 168 5,387
1 PB: Predicted Benign, PM: Predicted Malware
2 AB: Actual Benign, PM: Actual Malware
Table A.18: Detailed Detection Result on Drebin
2 Fold 3 Fold
PB1 PM PB PM
AB2 37,246 381 AB 36,872 755
AM 1,421 18,668 AM 618 19,471
5 Fold 10 Fold
PB PM PB PM
AB 36,779 848 AB 37,193 434
AM 436 19,653 AM 611 19,478
1 PB: Predicted Benign, PM: Predicted Malware
2 AB: Actual Benign, PM: Actual Malware
Table A.19: Detailed Detection Result on MalDozer
2 Fold 3 Fold
PB1 PM PB PM
AB2 36,673 954 AB 36,118 1,509
AM 1,821 31,245 AM 2,006 31,060
5 Fold 10 Fold
PB PM PB PM
AB 36,621 1,006 AB 36,426 1,201
AM 1,585 31,481 AM 1,417 31,649
1 PB: Predicted Benign, PM: Predicted Malware
2 AB: Actual Benign, PM: Actual Malware
Table A.20: Detailed Detection Result on All Dataset
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Figure A.13: attribution confusion matrices
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